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Abstract 
Corruption is a phenomenon which affects societies negatively in various ways. The costs of 
corruption are pollical, economic and social, as well as environmental. The phenomena have 
numerous explanations, and this study focuses on the economic determinants of corruption 
being economic development, economic freedom and income distribution. The aim with this 
study is to examine the relationship between corruption and its economic determinants, 
answering the research question “How does economic determinants, such as economic 
development, economic freedom and income distribution, affect corruption in Europe?”. 
Previous research has placed great emphasis on the relationship between economic components 
and corruption, however more focus on the determinants and their effects on corruptions needs 
to be contributed. Further, the relationship needs more recent examination as well as focus on 
the European countries. By using data from the Quality of Government Institute (QoG), 
regression analysis is carried out examining the relationship between corruption and its 
economic determinants. The results indicate that some economic determinants have an effect 
on corruption in Europe, where economic development has an explanatory effect, and economic 
freedom has a direct effect on corruption. Income distribution indicated no significance when 
testing at a bivariate level but turned out significant at a multivariate level with controls.  
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Introduction 
Europe as a continent has some of the cleanest economies in the world, in terms of being free 
from corruption. Although, when measuring levels of corruption in Europe, results shows that 
corruption exists. Despite the fact that it exists, it is also frequently increasing (MacDonald and 
Majeed, 2011). The levels of corruption in Europe are still relatively low when comparing to 
developing economies around the world. Thus, when comparing some of the more developed 
countries in Europe, some are more corrupt than other although they might have a more 
developed economy than the other. Within Europe, the corruption levels vary a lot from county 
to country (MacDonald and Majeed, 2011). It does not seem to matter whether a country is 
located near a less or more corrupt country, the levels of corruption still differ. The corruption 
is neither bound to stay within just one country, although it can. (MacDonald and Majeed, 
2011).  
 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon which has numerous consequences and explanations. It 
is usually understood as ‘misuse of public power for private benefit’, where the ‘private benefit’ 
may accumulate on different levels (Lambsdorff, 2005b, p.4). Corruption can be attributed to 
local, national and regional, as well as global level. One can see corruption as a general disarray 
that permeates and distorts the economic and political system, primarily at a country level, 
although often with international siding. On a concrete level it is about immense amounts of 
money diverted from public funds, often relocated through companies and offshores in a way 
that makes it difficult to trace, to subsequently use the money for private interests. On a national, 
regional and global level the question is closely related to for example embezzlement, tax 
avoidance, money laundering, bribery, nepotism and VAT frauds (OECD, 2020).  
 
Societies suffer from corruption in a variety of ways, since it has a negative impact on the 
politics, economy, social context and the environment. The negative impact on politics imprints 
on the democracy and rule of law. It is damaging both established and developing democracies 
since the actions of corruption makes institutions and offices lose their legitimacy. Corrupt 
societies also suffer economically and make them loose their national wealth. Politicians misuse 
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their public power for private benefits by for example investing public resources in projects, 
commonly being infrastructural enlengthened processes. These projects are in line with the 
politician’s pockets which makes them wealthier while the society suffers from their actions. 
Corruption also affects the market negatively by being an obstacle for fair structures and 
competition, thus hinders investments. Corruption also destroys the structure in a society as it 
undermines citizen’s trust in political institutions and politicians. This kind of situation makes 
it even harder to fight the corruption. Further, corrupt societies often either lacks or do not apply 
the environmental regulations and legislation which results in the environment suffering from 
corruption. It has serious consequences meaning that entire ecological systems are being 
destroyed and valuable natural resources are being disrespectfully advantaged (International, 
2020).  
 
What causes corruption, and in turn results in these consequences, cannot be explained by only 
one determinant. The phenomenon is complex and exists through many different factors. 
Common determinants of corruption are the political and economic environment, authority’s 
ethics and morality, as well as tradition, religion and geographic factors (Lambsdorff, 2005a; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1996). However, this study will focus on the economic determinants of 
corruption which many researchers have pointed out as causes of corruption (Ahmed et al., 
2004; Ata and Arvas, 2011; Bosco, 2016; MacDonald and Majeed, 2011; Paldam, 2002; Rose-
Ackerman, 1996). Economic development is the first determinant of corruption which will be 
focused on in this study. It is one of the well-known causes of corruption, as corruption mostly 
appears in poor and middle-income countries. Corruption tends to decrease when a great 
transition is made into becoming a high-income country (Paldam, 2002).  
 
Economic development is also declared as a continual determinant of corruption since more 
recent literature (Bosco, 2016) does not differ from previous literature (Paldam, 2002). The fact 
that increased economic development reduces corruption levels also indicates that rich and 
developed countries have the inquiry for institutional control, as well as good governance which 
decreases corrupt and illegal activities among officeholders (Bosco, 2016). Furthermore, rich 
countries also have the ability to afford efficient tax administration and provide higher salaries 
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to the highest state administration (Bosco, 2016), as well as reduce discount rates of both 
bribery givers and takers (MacDonald and Majeed, 2011). In contrast to wealthy societies, 
countries with low income levels close to minimal wealth rather encourages corrupt solutions 
to enable higher incomes (MacDonald and Majeed, 2011).  
 
The second determinant of corruption that will be focused on is economic freedom. Countries 
with low economic freedom and much regulation tend to be rent seeking and high in corruption, 
as restricting the economic freedom, expectably reduces the competition levels which in turn 
also encourages corruption (Ades and Tella, 1999; Paldam, 2002). The regulatory regime has 
an important economic role that interacts with the inflation levels. The illegal rent seeking is a 
huge problem of corruption and the correlation between high levels of corruption and potential 
for rent seeking is strong (Paldam, 2002). Researches have also been studying on the extent to 
which corruption can be explained by low level of competition between private firms (Ades 
and Tella, 1999; Paldam, 2002). The explanation between this link is that when the competition 
is low and restricted, the profits increase which in turn means that politicians can make the most 
out of the situation and inflict the profits in exchange for a share (Ades and Tella, 1999).  
 
The third economic determinant of corruption that will be focused on is income distribution. 
The corruption level is often higher when there is a skewed income distribution. This correlation 
occurs as a consequence of inequality and poverty, which leads to an increased inducement for 
illegal gains, thus corruption. A skewed income distribution should result in a high level of 
corruption (Paldam, 2002), and empirical results ascertain that corruption increases when the 
income distribution does (Ata and Arvas, 2011). However, income distribution does not always 
appear statistically significant, but should not be excluded as potential correlation in future 
research (Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 2007). For example, Paldam (2002) believes that that a 
skewed income distribution should result in a high level of corruption, although his study does 
not show strong empirical evidence. There is a connection between skewed income distribution 
and high corruption, but these results are not robust (Paldam, 2002). Therefore, further research 
should be done in this relation (Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 2007), for instance by adding more 
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countries to the dataset and representing a complete global selection, income distribution shows 
up statistically significant (Ahmed et al., 2004).  
 
Most of the research on the extent of economic determinants of corruption is not quite recent 
nor up to date (Ades and Tella, 1999; Ahmed et al., 2004; Ata and Arvas, 2011; Bosco, 2016; 
Gerring and Thacker, 2005; MacDonald and Majeed, 2011; Paldam, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 
1996; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000; Treisman, 2007). There are only a few studies with specific 
focus on Europe (Bosco, 2016; MacDonald and Majeed, 2011) and it is also more common to 
study the effects of corruption rather than its causes. Therefore, my ambition is to contribute 
with a study on how economic determinants affects corruption that is more up to date, as well 
as prioritizing the European countries. I believe that it is important to raise awareness in the 
extent that even Europe, with one of the cleanest economies, is corrupt with underlaying 
economic causes. Since some of the economic determinants are continual it is also interesting 
to see if it is still the case, and also if some of determinants are more or less correlated than in 
previous research.  
 
Aim 
This study aims to examine the relationship between corruption and economic determinants 
such as economic development, economic freedom and income distribution. Based on previous 
theories on the relationship, I aim to contribute to the field of research with more focus on the 
effect that economic determinants have on corruption, rather than the effects of corruption. This 
study also aims to contribute more recent statistics on the topic, as well as focusing on the 
European countries. Due to this, my research question is:  
How does economic determinants, such as economic development, economic freedom and 






The thesis will begin with presenting previous research and my theory regarding corruption and 
its explanatories; economic development, economic freedom and income distribution. 
Furthermore, I will go through my chosen quantitative method and the material I am using. 
After that follows my results with interpretation, and lastly ending my thesis with discussion, 
conclusions and proposals for future research.  
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Previous research and theory 
Corruption 
In this study corruption is measured according to The Bayesian Corruption Index which is a 
composite index of the apprehended overall level of corruption (Standaert, 2015). Within the 
framework of The Bayesian Corruption Index, corruption is defined as ‘misuse of public power 
for private benefit’ (Lambsdorff, 2005b, p.4). Considering the hidden character of corruption, 
direct measures are hard to archive. Therefore, the comprehensive corruption is compounded 
by opinions on corruption levels from inhabitants of the country, operative companies, non-
governmental organisations and office holders from both governmental and supranational 
organizations (Standaert, 2015).  
 
Corruption occurs when public power and private wealth superimpose. It is practised by 
political leaders who does business with private actors, for instance by buying off politicians 
with deals including money or job opportunities, but also by interfering with criminal groups 
and wealthy business interests. Politicians are practising a decision-making with an illegal use 
of willingness-to-pay. The repressive development within the central relationship is the key to 
the corrupt activity. Officeholders encourage briberies to take measure, even though it is often 
against their principal’s interests. However, there is a distinction between low-level selfish 
payments, and systematic corruption. Low-level briberies are often practised by officeholders 
in countries with a history of civil war or with very weak governments. In this case the 
officeholders are working under unclear rules which makes it easy for them to invent illegal 
acts or compel funds from ordinary people. In some cases, public authorities even provide 
protection for ordinary people who practice illegal activates such as smuggling or trafficking 
arms (Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  
 
Low-level corruption can result into inefficient and injustice distribution of already narrow 
benefits. It can also weaken the aspire of public programmes, encourage bureaucracy, make it 
more expensive doing business and lower the legitimacy of the state. In post-conflict countries 
aiming for economic development, corruption makes it even harder which further slows down 
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the process of economic recovery.  High-level corruption has similarities to low-level, 
corruption, but at a deeper level which is destructing for the state functioning. It can bring the 
state to a collapsing point and undermine the economy. In a post-conflict state, high-level 
corruption could lead to hit the actual bottom (Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  
 
Even in some of the cleanest economies in the world, such as countries located in Europe, 
corruption occurs. When measuring levels of corruption in Europe, results shows that 
corruption exists. In a time period between 1984 and 2007, the average corruption level in 
Europe has increased by 22 percent of the corruption index (MacDonald and Majeed, 2011). 
Despite the fact that the average corruption level in Europe is increasing, the levels are still 
relatively low when comparing to developing economies. Thus, when comparing some of the 
more developed countries in Europe, some are more corrupt than other although they might 
have a more developed economy than the other. Corruption levels varies across Europe, from 
country to country. It does not seem to matter whether a country is located near a less or more 
corrupt country, the levels still differ (MacDonald and Majeed, 2011). Nevertheless, within the 
European Union where a boarder free environment is provided for the citizens, the corruption 
is convenient to blossom over boarders. Corruption is not bound to stay within just one country, 
although it can (MacDonald and Majeed, 2011).  
 
Economic determinants of corruption 
Many researchers have pointed out the economic determinants of corruption, and some 
economic factors are more determinant to corruption than others (Ahmed et al., 2004; Ata and 
Arvas, 2011; Bosco, 2016; MacDonald and Majeed, 2011; Paldam, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 
1996). Most of the researches on economic determinants of corruption are focusing on market 
corruption or bribery, since a common view of corruption is mistreating power of the public 
office for self-interests. Therefore, the focus of what is left to counteract the corruption, often 
leads to discretionary power, economic rents and weak institutions (Aidt, 2003). However, 
corruption is complicated and consists of multiple parts, even among the economic factors 
which results in many different theories. However, this study will focus on the economic 




Corruption mostly appears in poor and middle-income countries, and the corruption tends to 
disappear when they do a great transition into becoming high-income countries. Rich countries 
are transparent and fast in their transactions and therefore also efficient, whilst in poor countries 
corruption is a further factor which makes transactions even slower, non-transparent and 
therefore more inefficient (Paldam, 2002). Countries with less reported corruption and better 
functioning government, often tends to be wealthier and have higher growth rates. Nevertheless, 
it is indefinable if low levels of economic development and income is the cause or consequence 
of corruption. Presumably, there is a causal relationship in both directions, meaning that the 
causal arrow most likely runs both ways between corruption and economic development (Rose-
Ackerman, 1996).  
 
Recent literature (Bosco, 2016) does not differ from more previous literature (Paldam, 2002), 
which indicates that economic development is a continual determinant of corruption. Latter 
results still indicates that corruption is reduced by an increased economic development 
measured in GDP per capita, however the analysis includes only European countries (Bosco, 
2016). The fact that increased economic development reduces corruption levels also indicates 
that rich and developed countries have the inquiry for institutional control, as well as good 
governance which decreases corrupt and illegal activities among officeholders (Bosco, 2016). 
Furthermore, rich countries also have the ability to afford efficient tax administration and 
provide higher salaries to the highest state administration (Bosco, 2016). This is acknowledged 
by other researchers as well (i.e. MacDonald and Majeed, 2011).  
 
A high level of economic development affects corruption in various ways, for example it 
reduces discount rates of both bribery givers and takers which increases the illegal activity since 
they will not find it as keen anymore. Punishment costs as deterrent for corruption works good 
for wealthy individuals since the cost may be much higher for them. Further, similarly as 
mentioned before (Bosco, 2016) rich societies do not accept corruption since the citizens are 
aware of their rights and often reacts to illegal activities such as corruption (MacDonald and 
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Majeed, 2011). In contrast to wealthy societies, countries with low income levels close to 
minimal wealth rather encourages corrupt solutions to enable higher incomes (MacDonald and 
Majeed, 2011). The problem with economic development in relation to corruption is relevant 
even in Europe. Although many of the European countries are developed economies, there are 
still other European countries that are not developed economies. The variety makes the 
European countries relevant, but also putting the corruption and economic development in 
relation to other factors affecting corruption ( Bosco, 2016; MacDonald and Majeed, 2011).  
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of economic development, the lower the level of corruption.  
 
Economic freedom 
Countries with low economic freedom and much too regulation tend to be rent seeking and high 
in corruption. However, regulation is still needed in order to ensure competition between 
companies and to prevent monopoly (Ades and Tella, 1999; Paldam, 2002). The illegal rent 
seeking is a huge problem of corruption and the correlation between high levels of corruption 
and potential for rent seeking is strong. However, this leads to the importance of economic 
freedom (Paldam, 2002). The higher the level of economic freedom, the more the opportunities 
for rent seeking decreases, thus a reduce of corruption levels (MacDonald and Majeed, 2011). 
Low economic freedom is statistically significant as a determinant of corruption (Ata and 
Arvas, 2011), which the previous relationship mentioned between high levels of corruption and 
potential for rent seeking also points out. When the economic freedom index increases with one 
point, the corruption index increases with approximately 1,3416 points (Ata and Arvas, 2011). 
Higher points in economic freedom index means less economic freedom and higher points in 
corruption index means higher degree of corruption (Ata and Arvas, 2011; Paldam, 2002).  
 
Researchers have been studying on the extent to which corruption can be explained by low level 
of competition between private firms (Ades and Tella, 1999; Paldam, 2002). The explanation 
between this link is that when the competition is low and too restricted, the companies’ profits 
increase. However, the low competition is a result of biased government policy which profits 
specific companies. This turn gives politicians profits back in form of for example bribes or 
shares in the company (Ades and Tella, 1999). There is a tendency for lower wages when the 
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competition is low, since it becomes less attractive to elicit integrity. Thus, the low wages also 
avert corruption since the profits to corrupt officeholders fall with competition. However, 
results show that there is a significant relation between economic freedom and clean 
government (Ades and Tella, 1999), which other studies also confirms in similar ways (Gerring 
and Thacker, 2005; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000).  
Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of economic freedom, the lower the level of corruption.  
 
Income distribution 
The corruption level is often higher when there is a skewed income distribution (Paldam, 2002). 
When the income distribution is more equal in a society, there will be a larger middle class. The 
middle class can act to hold for example officeholders responsible for their actions, which in 
turn prevents high levels of corruption (Ata and Arvas, 2011). This in contrast to a society in 
which the income distribution is highly inequal. When the income distribution is highly 
unequal, there will be a small group of very wealthy people who will have greater motivation 
and opportunity to use bribery and fraud. The use of bribery and fraud helps them maintain but 
also advance their status (Ata and Arvas, 2011). Also, the high inequality of income entails 
poverty which can lead to an increased inducement for illegal gains, thus corruption (Ata and 
Arvas, 2011; Paldam, 2002). When people in poverty tries to sustain their lives, they might gain 
illegal income which in turn sustains the corruption (Ata and Arvas, 2011).   
 
Paldam’s (2002) theory is that a skewed income distribution should result in a high level of 
corruption, although his study does not show strong empirical evidence. There is a connection 
between a skewed income distribution and high corruption, but his study does not give robust 
results. Therefore, further research should be done in this matter (Paldam, 2002). However, 
other empirical results ascertain that one point increase in the income distribution decreases the 
corruption index by 0,1080 point, meaning that corruption increases when the income 
distribution does (Ata and Arvas, 2011). This shows the causal relationship where income 
distribution affects the level of corruption (Ata and Arvas, 2011). However, income distribution 
does not always appear statistically significant, but should not be excluded as potential 
correlation in future research (Paldam, 2002; Treisman, 2007). For example, Paldam (2002) 
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believes that that a skewed income distribution should result in a high level of corruption, 
although his study does not show strong empirical evidence. There is a connection between 
skewed income distribution and high corruption, but the study does not give robust results 
(Paldam, 2002). Therefore, further research should be done in this relation (Paldam, 2002; 
Treisman, 2007). For instance, by adding more countries to the dataset and representing a 
complete global selection, income distribution shows up statistically significant (Ahmed et al., 
2004).  
Hypothesis 3: The higher the level of equality in distribution income, the lower the level of 
corruption.  
 
Other determinants of corruption 
Other determinants of corruption that are going to be included in my analysis are democracy, 
education and also fractionalization such as religion and ethnic. These are alternative 
explanatories to corruption.  
 
Democracy often turns out as a statistically significant determinant of the luck of corruption, 
but it is important to note that democratic elections alone do not always cure corruption (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). Special interests sometimes play a major roll, but some specific electoral 
systems are more sensitive to it than others. Some groups practice legal behaviour, while other 
practice corruption when narrow groups maintains the power. In this decision, the character of 
the political system plays a crucial role. However, having a democratic electoral system which 
is competitive, helps to restrict corruption since opposition candidates have motivation for 
exposing their corrupt opponent leaders. But after all, democratic election systems have their 
negative effect on corruption as well. When campaigning for elections, some choose to use 
illegal accessions and bribe politicians. This is a way of undermining the democracy and add 
negative effects to it (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).  
 
Higher educated people are more likely to be put in a position to bribe. High income and 
education have significant positive effects on the tendency of being prompted to bribe in 
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developing countries. However, this is only applicable in developing countries. In already 
developed countries the impact of high income and education is statistically insignificant. The 
reason why this group of people are more targeted is because higher education and incomes 
brings them closer to the government (Mocan, 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 1996).  
 
Between ethnic fractionalization and institutional efficiency, a negative and significant 
correlation is found. In an ethnically fractionalized society conflict could appear and thereby 
cause political instability, even worse cases like war. Having many different ethnical groups in 
a society is also scientifically correlated to high levels corruption. The reason for the correlation 
is that bureaucrats might benefit their ethnic group (Mauro, 1995). However, religious 
fractionalization shows statically significance as a determinant of corruption, but it turns out 
that a country with a great religious diversity has less corruption than a country with only one 
dominant religion (Paldam, 1999) Although, the same argument as for ethnic fractionalization 
has been used when talking about religious fractionalization. At the same time as religious 
diversity is claimed as a great favour for a country, religious diversity might also lead to 
political and social instability in a society. And just like ethnicity, it could lead to worse 
conflicts such as civil war (Paldam, 1999). Despite that argument, Paldam (1999) claims that 
in terms of corruption, religious diversity is an obvious favour.  
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Method and material  
Method 
I have chosen to perform a quantitative study by using cross-section data from the Quality of 
Government Institute (QoG) 2019 (Teorell et al., 2019). Since the aim of my study is to 
investigate in the relationship between corruption and selected economic determinants, I am 
going to perform a cross-sectional regression analysis. The analysis will test what impact my 
independent variables have on my dependent variable, controlling for a set of indicators 
representing alternative explanations for corruption.  
 
I will begin with bivariate regressions for each of the independent variables acting as economic 
determinants of corruption, followed by a multivariate regression with all of the independent 
variables included. The reason why I choose to do both bivariate and multivariate regressions 
is because the multiple regression analysis is sensitive to certain types of relationships between 
variables. I have to be fully aware that multicollinearity could appear. If some predictors turn 
out to be collinear, the result could be disordered and then I will not include the multivariate 
regression in my study. In any case, I will start with the bivariate regressions on each variable 
and that will give me a broader view of the relationships between the dependent variable and 
each independent variable separately. Because of the sensitivity to certain types of relationships 
between variables in multiple regression, I will make sure to perform both the bivariate and 
multivariate regressions once again, but under control of other variables. The control variables 
are also recognized determinants of corruption, but not economic. This second round of 
regressions enables me to analyse the relationships once again and also observe if the impact 
changes under control of other variables recognized as determinants of corruption. With this 
method I hope for a result that can show more empirical perception for economic determinants 
of corruption.  
 
I had to choose between time-series and cross-section data. I decided to do a time-series 
analysis, since it was optimal for my primary idea. I wanted to test the relationship of my 
variables between 2010 and 2015, unfortunately it would have been too challenging considering 
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I have not gotten the opportunity learning the method yet.  My time would not be enough within 
the framework of a bachelor thesis (Esaiasson et al., 2017). By doing a cross-section analysis I 
will still be able to test the relationship of my variables near the same time period. Data from 
2015 is prioritized in the cross-section data set and thereby a maximum of plus/minus three 




All of the variables that will be used in this study are retrieved from the Quality of Government 
Standard Dataset (QoG) 2019 (Teorell et al., 2019). As described in my method, I have chosen 
to use the QoG cross-section dataset where data from around 2015 is included. The 2015 data 
is prioritized, yet if data from 2015 does not exist for a country, data from 2016 will be included 
instead. If neither the 2015 nor 2016 data exist for a country, then data from 2014 will be 
included instead. Consequently, the maximum goes upon three years plus or minus from 2015 
(Teorell et al., 2019). This study has a focus on European countries; and data for the set of 
variables of interest for 42 European countries included into the analysis (see Annex 1). The 




For my dependent variable representing corruption, I am going to use the Bayesian Corruption 
Index (BCI) downloaded from the Quality of Government Standard Dataset (QoG) 2019 
(Teorell et al., 2019). The index values lay between 0-100, where an increase is corresponding 
to a rise in the level of corruption (Teorell et al., 2019). The Bayesian Corruption Index is a 
compounded index of the apprehended overall level of corruption (Standaert, 2015). Within the 
framework of The Bayesian Corruption Index, corruption is mentioned as ‘misuse of public 
power for private benefit’ (Lambsdorff, 2005b, p.4). Considering the hidden character of 
corruption, direct measures are hard to archive. Therefore, the apprehended corruption is 
compounded by opinions on corruption levels from inhabitants of the country, operative 
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companies, non-governmental organisations and office holders from both governmental and 
supranational organizations. The index is an composition of 17 different surveys and 110 
different survey questions that comprehends the perceived level of corruption (Standaert, 2015).  
 
Independent variables 
My first independent variable represents economic development. The measure I will use is Real 
Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDP), which originally is from Madison Project Database 
(MPD) 2018 (Bolt et al., 2018) and transferred to the Quality of Government Standard Dataset 
(QoG) 2019 (Teorell et al., 2019). Madison Project Database 2018 provides information on 
comparative economic growth and income levels over a very long time. The version of 2018 
that will be used in this study covers 169 countries until 2016. The Real GDP per Capita is 
measured in 2011 US dollars with multiple benchmarks (Bolt et al., 2018; Teorell et al., 2019).  
 
My second independent variable represents economic freedom. The measure I will use is 
Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFI) produced by Fraser Institute in Economic 
Freedom of the World Dataset 2016 (Gwartney et al., 2016). The dataset was later transferred 
to the Quality of Government Standard Dataset (QoG) 2019 (Teorell et al., 2019). The 
Economic Freedom of the World Index is based on objective components reflecting the 
presence of economic freedom. The index includes 21 components created to recognize the 
consistency of institutional arrangements and economic freedom policies in five different fields. 
These includes size of government, legal structure and security of property rights, access to 
sound money, freedom to trade internationally and lastly regulation of credit, labour and 
business. The index is scaled from 0-10 where it starts from less economic freedom to more 
economic freedom.  
 
My third and last independent variable serves for income distribution. It will be measured by a 
GINI Index (GINI) retrieved from The World Bank 2016 collection of development indicators 
(Bank, 2016). The collection is transferred to the Quality of Government Standard Dataset 
(QoG) 2019 (Teorell et al., 2019). The GINI Index shows to which extent the distribution of 
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income between individuals or households in an economy diverge from a perfect equal 
distribution. The cumulative percentage of the total income towards the cumulative number of 
receivers is plotted by a Lorenz curve. It begins with the poorest individual or household. The 
GINI Index then measures the field between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetic line of absolute 
equality. The indication shows in percentage of the upper limit in the field under the line of 
absolute equality. This means that 0 represents perfect equality, while 100 serve as perfect 
inequality (Teorell et al., 2019).  
 
Control variables 
The control variables will allow me test wheatear the status of the explanatory variables remain 
unchanged, significant or not significant, regardless of adding other variables that potentially 
affects corruption levels.  
 
My first control variable stands for democracy. I am going to use an Electoral democracy index 
(EDI) from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset version 8 (V-Dem) 2018 (Coppedge et al., 
2018). The Varieties of Democracy is an updated and innovative approach for measuring and 
conceptualizing democracy. The V-dem Dataset version 8 that I am going to use is transferred 
into the Quality of Government Standard Dataset (QoG) 2019 (Teorell et al., 2019). The 
variable standing for democracy is based on the question: ‘To what extent is the ideal of 
electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?’ (Teorell et al., 2019). 
 
My second control variable is a Human Capital Index (HCI) which measures education based 
on years of schooling and assumed returns. The index is originally from the database Penn 
World Table version 9.0 which provides information on relative levels of income, output, inputs 
and productivity. The dataset includes cases from 1950 to 2014 on 182 countries (Feenstra, 
2015). The Human Capital Index from Penn World Table is transferred to the Quality of 
Government Standard Dataset (QoG) 2019 (Teorell et al., 2019) where I have retrieved it from. 
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I am going to use two fractionalization variables as controls. The first one is ethnic 
fractionalization that represents my third control variable. The variable measures ethnicity 
within the frame of racial and linguistical attributes combined (Alesina et al., 2003). This 
variable is found in the Quality of Government Standard Dataset (QoG) 2019 (Teorell et al., 
2019). The second fractionalization variable is religion which stands for my last control 
variable. Religious fractionalization is measured by the likelihood that two haphazardly 
selected people from a certain country will not belong to the same religious group. A 
fractionalized society will have a high number of combinations with people not belonging to 
the same religious group (Alesina et al., 2003). This variable is also found in the Quality of 






Table 1- Summary statistics of variables 
Variables Obs. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Corruption 42 8.62 63.76 35.83 17.14 
Economic development 40 5569 76305 30705 16289 
Economic freedom 39 5.38 8.42 7.39 0.57 
Income distribution 38 25.4 37.7 31.41 3.82 
Democracy 39 0.26 0.91 0.75 0.19 
Education 35 2.43 3.73 3.29 0.27 
Ethnic fractionalization 42 0.04 0.71 0.30 0.20 
Religious fractionalization 42 0.09 0.72 0.41 0.19 
 
Table 1 is a summary of all variables that are going to be utilized in the regression analysis. The 
number of observations show how many countries will be included when variables are utilized. 
This means that the most possible countries included to the regression will be 42, and least 
possible countries included will be 35. This indicates that the number of countries will be 
different from model to model, for example when adding controls.  
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Table 2 – Frequency analysis on corruption index 0-100 per country 
 
Table 2 shows the levels of corruption according to the Bayesian Corruption Index for each 
country included in the analysis. The index is scaled from 0-100 where 100 is the highest 
possible level of corruption and 0 is the lowest possible level of corruption. This table indicates 
that Ukraine has the highest score of corruption index among all the European countries 
included, while Finland has the lowest score. The table also shows that the corruption levels 




Table 3 – Regression analysis  
 1 2 3 4 


























N 40 39 38 37 
R2 
 
0.6341 0.4196 0.0182 0.7065 
p <0,1, *: p <0,05, **: p <0,01, ***: p <0,001  
 
Model 1 shows that when the economic development (GDP) level is at 0, the corruption (BCI) 
is at about 62. When the GDP increase by 1 unit, the BCI will decrease with approximately 
0.0008 units of measurement. The result show that the relationship between GDP and BCI in 
model 1 is statistically negatively significant at D = 0,001, which means that at a bivariate level 
GDP has a significant negative effect on BCI. The result for model 1 supports my H1: The 
higher the level of economic development, the lower the level of corruption. Model 2 shows 
that when the economic freedom (EFI) level is at 0, the BCI is at approximately 180. When the 
EFI increases with 1 unit, the BCI will decrease with about -19.4 units of measurement. The 
result show that the relationship between EFI and BCI in in model 2 is statistically negatively 
significant at D = 0,001, which means that at a bivariate level EFI has a significant negative 
effect on BCI. Note that this says that a country with no economic freedom at all would have a 
BCI level of 180, but the index has a maximum level of 100. The result appears like this because 
there is no observation on a case with no economic freedom at all, therefore the computing 
software is making its own approximation about which level of the index a country with no 
economic freedom at all would be. The result for model 2 supports my H2: The higher the level 
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of economic freedom, the lower the level of corruption. The result in model 3 shows that when 
the income distribution (GINI) is 0, the BCI level is at 17.37. When the GINI increases with 1, 
the BCI level will increase with 0.61. The relationship between GINI and BCI in model 3 is not 
statistically significant. Model 3 does not support my H3: The higher the level of equality in 
distribution income, the lower the level of corruption.  
 
The next step in my analysis is to do a multivariate regression. I am doing the multivariate 
regression due to be able to control several variables at the same time. The multivariate 
regression enables me to investigate how a change of one variable can affect the corruption 
level while other variables are held constant. I have chosen to not look at any interaction effects, 
but it is important to point out that the multivariate regression would allow me to do that as 
well. However, by adding multiple variables into the regression I have a broader field to explain 
what affects corruption. It means that I am building my models larger which results in better 
explaining models. A multivariate regression could result in some variables falling out, 
meaning that a variable that might have seemed to be significant in the bivariate regression may 
not be significant in the multivariate regression. The reason why this could happen is because 
at least two of the explanatory variables might define the same things in the corruption level. 
Therefore, one will be excluded and fall out.  
 
This leads us to model 4, where the constant 117.5 equals the corruption index level in a country 
with no GDP, economic freedom or income distribution, meaning that all of the explanatories 
are at level 0. If GDPpc increases by 1 unit then the corruption index BCI will decrease by 
0.00062 units of measurement, if the level of economic freedom increases by 1 unit then BCI 
decreases by 10.5 units of measurement and if the GINI increases by 1 unit then BCI increases 
by 0.51 units of measurement. Both the variables for economic development and economic 
freedom are in this model statistically negatively significant at the D = 0.001 level. However, 
the variable for income distribution is not significant at all and therefore I cannot say anything 
about the effect it has on the BCI level. The result in model 4 supports my H1: The higher the 
level of economic development, the lower the level of corruption, and H2: The higher the level 
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of economic freedom, the lower the level of corruption, but not my H3: The higher the level of 
equality in distribution income, the lower the level of corruption.  
 
Table 4 – Cont. regression analysis  



































































N 33 33 32 32 
R2 0.7437 0.6072 0.5440 0.7838 
p <0,1, *: p <0,05, **: p <0,01, ***: p <0,001  
 
In table 4 I add the control variables to the models analysed in table 3. The reason for this is to 
control if the variables still are significant or not when adding other variables potentially 
affecting corruption levels. In model 5 we can see that by adding the control variables the 
negative significance of economic development does not change and the value of the variable 
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only changes by approximately 0.0001. The result in model 5 means that my H1 is still 
supported. Model 6 shows that the negative significance for economic freedom has lowered 
from D = 0.001 to D = 0.01 and the variable value has changed with approximately 7. However, 
model 6 still supports my H2 although the significance level lowered. Model 7 shows no change 
in significance level for income distribution which means that my H3 is still not supported.  
 
However, when looking at model 8, I can see some interesting results. Economic development 
is still negatively significant at D = 0.001 and the negative significance of economic freedom is 
lowered to D = 0.01. But the significance for income distribution has gone from insignificant 
to positively significant at the D = 0.1 level. So even when adding the control variables, it does 
not change my explanatory variables effects or significance that much, except in model 8 where 
income distribution becomes positively significant. This is interesting since GINI was not 
significant in neither the bivariate regression, nor the multivariate regression without controls. 
Model 8 continues to support my H1 and H2, and this time also my H3.  
 
Continuing with looking at the R2 values to determine which of the regressions represents the 
best model. The highest R2 is given in model 8 with an R2 of 0.7838, however, all of the control 
variables in this model are insignificant. An interesting thing to note is that the R2 value of 
model 1 which is the economic development bivariate regression has an R2 of 0.63. This is 
quite high for just a bivariate regression and shows that on its own economic development has 
quite a big impact on BCI when speaking about explanatory effects and not direct effects like 
in the value of the variable where economic freedom has the biggest effect. Furthermore, model 
2 with economic freedom also has quite a high R2 for being a bivariate with R2 = 0.6072, it also 






My aim with this study was to examine the relationship between corruption and economic 
determinants such as economic development, economic freedom and income distribution. I also 
aimed to investigate the relationship focusing mainly on the effects that economic determinants 
have on corruption, rather than the effects of corruption. Further, I found it of great importance 
to study this topic focusing on the European countries for two main reasons. First, it is 
interesting how corruption occurs in even some of the cleanest economies. Second, not much 
research has been done focusing on Europe. Since some determinants of corruption is continual, 
it is also of importance to continue contributing to the field of research to see if the theories still 
are up to date.  
 
Firstly, at a bivariate level my study shows a significant negative relationship between 
economic development and corruption, as well as between economic freedom and corruption. 
However, the relationship between income distribution and corruption does not have any 
statistical significance at a bivariate level. At a multivariate level, economic development and 
economic freedom are still statistically negatively significant. However, the variable for income 
distribution is not significant at all and therefore I cannot say anything about the effect it has 
on the corruption level. These results supports my H1: The higher the level of economic 
development, the lower the level of corruption, and H2: The higher the level of economic 
freedom, the lower the level of corruption, but not my H3: The higher the level of equality in 
distribution income, the lower the level of corruption. These results confirm the causal 
relationship between corruption and economic development, as well as corruption and 
economic freedom which is consistent to previous research. However, the results do not confirm 
any causal relationship between corruption and income distribution which is partly consistent 
to previous research.  
 
Secondly, when added control variables into the regressions some relationships remained the 
same and some changed. At a bivariate level, the relationship between economic development 
and corruption remained the same (negatively significant at D = 0.001). The relationship 
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between economic freedom and corruption still remains negatively significant, but the level of 
significance lowered (from D = 0.001 to D = 0.01). The variable for income distribution does 
still not show any significance at a bivariate level. Consequently, adding controls into the 
bivariate regression did not change my results much. They still support my H1: The higher the 
level of economic development, the lower the level of corruption, and H2: The higher the level 
of economic freedom, the lower the level of corruption, but not my H3: The higher the level of 
equality in distribution income, the lower the level of corruption. However, when running a 
multivariate regression including the controls, interesting results appear. The variables for 
economic development and economic freedom remains the same as at a bivariate level, but the 
variable for income distribution goes from insignificant to positively significant at D = 0.1. 
There is no obvious answer to why the relationship between income distribution and corruption 
becomes significant when adding controls to the multivariate regression, but it can be discussed.  
 
The relationship between income distribution and corruption was not significant in neither the 
bivariate regression, nor the multivariate regression without controls. The positive significance 
in the multivariate regression with controls might infer that the true relationship between 
income distribution and corruption cannot be shown until adding more variables to the model. 
However, this also highlights the fact that it is quite hard to determine what affects corruption 
when some variables, such as income distribution in this case, will not show any significance 
without adding other variables. Furthermore, this highlights the importance of a good 
theoretical background before beginning hypothesis testing. 
 
Concluding my main findings, the relationship between economic development and corruption 
is strong, meaning that economic development on its own has quite a big impact on corruption 
when speaking about explanatory effects. However, when speaking about direct effects 
economic freedom has the biggest effect on corruption. Unfortunately, the results for income 
distribution in relation to corruption cannot be explained. There is no strong empirical evidence 
for the income distribution as an explanatory of corruption. The results in this study mostly 
agrees with previous research. There is a strong evidence for both economic development and 
economic freedom, both in previous research and in this study. One can also assume that these 
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relationships are continual since many years of research indicates similar results. Especially 
interesting is the relationship between income distribution and corruption. Previous research 
indicates mixed results on this relationship, which makes it hard to draw any conclusions. 
However, this study indicates a certain relationship between income distribution and corruption, 
but I think that it is important to further test the relationship for two reasons. First because it 
gave interesting results when adding controls to the multivariate regression in my study. Second 
because previous research also shows mixed results for this relationship. For this study, it 
important to highlight that my theory based on previous research also applies on Europe, despite 
that the corruption levels in European countries are low in general. Presumably, the variety with 
countries that have quite high corruption levels, makes the theory possible to apply on Europe.  
Overall, this study shows that some economic determinants have an effect on corruption in 
Europe, where economic development has an explanatory effect, and economic freedom has a 
direct effect on corruption.  
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